From Power Sharing to Democracy

Post-conflict societies invariably experience great difficulty in making their new democratic power-sharing institutions work. In Northern Ireland, the system for power sharing prescribed in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 has repeatedly broken down. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the system prescribed under the Dayton Accord of 1995 depends for its survival on the presence of a substantial international peacekeeping force. From Power Sharing to Democracy examines the theoretical underpinnings of power sharing as a means of achieving sustainable democratic governance. Contributors examine key areas, including Afghanistan, Cyprus, Kosovo, Macedonia, and South Africa, where power-sharing constitutions and political institutions have been employed or proposed. They provide an in-depth exploration of consociationalism, under which the previously warring ethnic communities are guaranteed a proportionate share of political offices and protection of their vital interests, and federalism, which provides for substantial territorial autonomy in cases where the communities are territorially segregated.